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In this paper I seek to do three related things; to identify the
dominant mode of production in the Swazi social formation and other
possible subsidiary modes; to establish the existence or otherwise
of classes In Swazi society; and to elucidate the development of
the Swazi state. Before I start however I should like to
make two disclaimers. Firstly I make no pretence at theoretical
rigour and have merely used the concepts employed In this paper to
illuminate my material. Secondly the questions raised by such
concepts are not easily answered by the data I have at my disposal.
Swazi tradition I do not doubt will help to give answers to those
questions, but first it will be necessary for those questions to be
posed. This I did not do during my own fieldwork in Swaziland,
and for that reason much of my paper will have a provisional ring.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations I feel justified in venturing
into this field. Swazi society does not as far as I can see fit
into recent categorisations of pre-capitalist modes of production
and its study may help in developing those categories further. At
the same time the questions raised by this mode of analysis
undoubtedly turn the spotlight on neglected areas of Swazt society
and even If only partially or provisionally answered must help our
understanding of how that society works. For that reason I make no
apologies at undertaking such an analysis and merely ask that It be
taken as much as a programme for research as the fruits of a
completed project.
The/ ...
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The Tributary Mode of Production
Hindess and Hirst define a mode of production as "an articulated
combination of relations and forces of production structured by the
dominance of the relations of production. The relations of
production", they go on, "define a specific mode of appropriation
of surplus labour and the specific form of social distribution of
the means of productions corresponding to that mode of appropriation
of surolus labour". The implications of the notions of articulation
and of dominance are of particular significance for the present
study. Later Hindess and Hirst make the point that, "a distinct
structure of relations of production supposes a set of forces of
production which corresponds to the conditions of the labour process
it establishes", and go on to reject the concept of an Asiatic mode
of production on the grounds that, "the conditions of appropriation
of surplus labour entailed by this mode do not transform the
labour process or the relation of the labourer to it". As a result
the relation of the relations of production and the forces of
production are characterised by, "a certain arbitrariness11! and the
conditions of proving the existence of the mode of production are
not met, i.e. forces cannot be deduced from the relations of
production. (1)
C
This is no small matter, as the mode of production characteristic
of most African social formations seems to correspond more closely
to the Asiatic mode of production than to any other, and once this
is rejected the bulk of African and indeed other social formations
known to history are relegated to some kind of 'modeless1 limbo.
An alternative must therefore be found, or else in one guise or other
the Asiatic mode must be revived. What in the first place are the
possible alternatives? In Hindess and Hirst's classification the
two most likelv candidates are the feudal mode of production and
what thev term the second variant of the primitive communist mode.
The second variant of the primitive communist mode of production
corresponds/...
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corresponds to what Rey and others have called the lineage mode of
production. (2) Its identifying characteristics are communal
appropriation of the social product and its extended or 'complex*
redistribution among the lineage members. Leaving aside for the
moment the question of whether the lineage mode of production is
characterised by classes or is classless, it is clear that it has
been widely distributed across the continent of Africa. Whether or
not that means that this has been the dominant mode of production
is however an entirely different question, for almost wherever one
looks one finds the lineage mode combined into other aggregates
like the village or the kingdom which themselves require definition
) in terms of modes of production.
Can these larger aggregates be considered as variants of the feudal
mode of production? In Hlndess and Hirstsfs terms they cannot, for
whereas the feudal mode of production presupposes a ruling class
which exists independently of the state machine, direct producers
who are politically and legally bound to their exploiters through
the right of eminent domain, and the absence of communal production,
most if not all of the larger collectivities of which we have been
speaking are characterised by the absence of an exploiting class
independent of the states, the absence of private property in land,
) and communal production. (3) The differences implied by all this
cannot be reduced simply to matters of scale. Amin for example
suggests that the feudal mode of production is only a decentralised
and regressive variant of the tributary mode of production (which he
sees as the dominant mode of production for most of the world's
historv), in as much as the rights to tribute and to ownership
previously vested in the state have reverted during periods of weak-
ness to individual feudal lords. (4) In fact the difference between
the two is far more fundamental than that. In the feudal mode of
production the mechanism for the appropriation of surplus (feudal
rent) and the property relations which go with that, involve
extensive control over the labour process on the part of the feudal
lord/...
lord and for this reason this excludes the possibility of communal
production. (5) In other words the forces of production are
structured by the relations of production and can be deduced from
them. In the tributary mode of production on the other.hand (which
includes the Asiatic mode) no such intensive or continuous structu-
ration of the labour process takes place. Production can be either
independent peasant or communal (6) and the exploiter has a purely
external relation to the process of production intervening to exact
tribute (or tax/rent in Hlndess and Hirst's terms) only once the
production process is complete. (7) Consequently the forces of
production are not in any meaningful way structured by the relations
of production, thev cannot be deduced from one another, and the
existence of the tributary or Asiatic mode of production remains
unproved.
Does this mean that there are no modes of production corresponding
to the larger aggregates of kingdom or chiefdom, and that we are
forced back on some kind of notion of hegemony which is rooted in but
not comprehended by the lineage mode? I think not. As Taylor
suggests in his review of Hindess and Hirst, the relations of
production established in the Asiatic mode of production are only
compatible with communai forces of production, and I am inclined to r
think that this is true of all tributary formations, since other
quasi-feudal mechanisms for structuring and reproducing the labour
process would be necessary if communal ones were abandoned. At the
same time Tavlor also suggests that the state in the Asiatic mode
of production is in fact obliged to intervene in the process of
production by building canals and the like so as to secure its
reproduction. (8) This type of large-scale intervention has been
relatively uncommon in Africa, a fact which has prompted Coquerry-
Vidrovitch to describe the African mode of production as the Asiatic
mode without large works. (9) Other kinds of intervention do
nevertheless occur. Among the Pedi regiments of young men are
organised/...
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organised by the chief to build walls and agricultural terracing,
while in the view of Guy, the Zulu state came into being at least
partly because of the varied nature of Zulu ecology and the need
to rationalise access to diverse kinds of pastures and soils.(10)
More generally, the provision of security enables the reproduction
of production, and prevents the Indiscriminate plundering which is
often the fate of acephalous groups.(11) In the Swazi state, one
sees these interventions of several similar kinds: control of
access to various zones of pasturage, control of the size and
reproduction of individual homesteads through witchcraft accusations,
and control over the cvcle of agricultural production through the
annual incwala ceremony, and through the withdrawal of young men
from the agricultural cycle into centralised age regiments.(12)
In sum then there seems to me to be sufficient articulation between
the forces and relations of production for us to reconsider the
possibility of tributary mode, although the task of actually
specifying that in a way that is theoretically coherent I shall
leave to those who are more theoretically sound.
Social classes, politics and the state
"No classes, no politics, no state" Is a passage that recurs
throughout the pages of pre-Capitalist modes of Production. What are
its implications for tributary modes of production in general, and
for that of the Swazi in particular? Following Engels, Hindess and
Hirst see the existence of the state and of politics as an effect
of the social division of labour, i.e. of the existence of social
classes. In social formations such as these "the political level
exists as the necessary space for the representation of the interests
of the various classes, and the presence of a state apparatus is a
necessarv condition of the maintenance and functioning of the
mechanism of appropriation of surplus labour by the ruling class".(13)
Otherwise, where social classes are absent, the state and politics
do not exist and the social formation is only constituted of economic
and ideological levels. Given this definition it is obviously
important to impart some precision to our notion of class, and to
see/...
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see whether classes can then be identified in tributary, and
particularly the Swazi, social formation. In Marxian theory the
separation of society into social classes arises from the social
division of labour between a class of labourers who are separated
from ownership of the means of production and a class of non-labourers
who control the means of production, and use this as the means of
appropriating surplus labour. On the basis of this definition
Hindess and Hirst reject outright the possibility of social classes
In the primitive communist mode of production. Since the mode of
appropriation of surplus labour is communal, they insist, there are
ipso facto no classes, and hence no possibility of politics and the
state.(14) Both Rey and Terray take the opposite view, asserting (
that control by elders over women in the first case and over
prestige goods in the other enabled the elders "to control the
surplus product, the partial or total use of which is for the
reproduction of relations of dependence between the direct producers
and this group", and out of this process they consider class
relations to emerge.(15) Without wishing to enter that debate
there does seem to be one point that should be made, which is that
if Hindess and Hirst see "the process of the formation of the
state (ksj identical to the process of transition from primitive
communism to some other mode of production", and if they consider
transitions from one mode of production to another to be the product
of class struggle, some kind of embrvonic class formation must be
possible in that mode for the transition to ever occur-(16)
It is that kind of embryonic class formation that seems to me to
characterise tributary formations in general and that of the Swazi
in particular. Its origins may perhaps be traced to the process
outlined by MeiIlassoux.
Through/-..
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Through historical accidents, usually due to contacts
with foreign formations, a group takes for all its
members the quality of 'senior* in relation to
other groups considered collectively as minor. All
the economic and social prerogatives of the elder are
transferred to the dominant class* usually an aristocratic
lineage. Prestations due to the elder become tributes
due to the lord who may also gain control over the
matrimonial policy of the community, and eventually
over the means of production-land. (17)
Meillassoux's conception suffers in some measure from the role it
ascribes to historical accidents, which in themselves presumably
ought to be explained. Thereafter however it is possible to see
these embryonic classes taking firmer shape. To take the Swazi
case as an example, participation in the trade to Delagoa Bay and
the ruling groups1 monopolisation of its profits helped further
boost the latter's power, which In turn was consolidated still
further by their move to the Shiselweni district in the south of
modern Swaziland, and the opportunities this presented for enforcing
unequal access to unevenly distributed means of production!. Part
of that process 1 have dealt with elsewhere, and I should like to
turn instead to the second phase of Swazi expansion which took place
at the beginning of the 1820s. (18)
At this point it is worth noting the comments of Hindess and Hirst
on the conquest situation. "Conquest11, they point out,
does not of itself produce state domination. The
conquering people are not phantoms, they existed prior
to the conquest and they must have a social organisation
and a mode of producing the means of subsistence. In the
first instance, the conqueror's mode of production will be
represented alongside that of the dominated people. The
dominant people receive tribute which is redistributed
according to their social institutions and relations of
production. No state is formed by thLs relation, dominant
people/subject people; the means of coercion to obtain
tribute are provided by the Gentile constitution of the
dominant people, and the subject people regulates Its own
affairs by its own institutions. The fact of conquest does
not/...
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not produce either class society or the state. The
conditions of transition to class society, of the
conversion of the conquerors into a non-labouring
ruling class, are not given in conquest as such. If
such a transition does take place then it is on the
basis of class society and irreconcilable class
antagonism that the state is formed, not on the
basis of conquest. Conquest only explains certain
conditions under which the state may be formed, it
does not explain the mechanisms of the formation of
the state. (19)
Conditions In the Svazi conquest area almost exactly mirror those
outlined above. For several years the Swazi resembled more
closely an army of occupation camped out in hostile territory,
than a settled administration. "In those early days11, one oral
history recalls, "there were no chiefs, only princes and leaders
of regiments" (20), and the same picture can be derived from the
evidence of Swazi messengers to Captain Gardener when they visited
Mgungundlovu in 18.35. The capital of Swaziland, they told him,
was Elangeni, and a little to the south was another village of
Lobamba, which between them housed the entire male population of
the Swazi, numbering no more than a few hundred men.(21) The
messengers were evidently exaggerating, no doubt for Zulu ears* as
we know of much more extensive Swazi settlement in this period,
especiallv in the South.(22) Yet in the area of conquest there /
was an element of truth In what they said. Few of Sobhuza's
brothers or sons were assigned chiefdoms in the central areas until
the closing years of Sobhuza's life, and the type of 'placing* to
which Kuper refers did not occur on any extensive scale until the
reign of his successor.(23) The history of Maphalaleni illustrates
the trend. Maphalaleni was established for LaNdwandwe, one of
Sobhuza's favourite wives, but so late in Sobhuza's reign that by
the time she got there Sobhuza was already dead.(24) The same
pattern repeats Itself throughout central Swaziland. Neither Maloyi
nor Malunge seem to have taken effective occupation of their chiefdoms
in the Mbuluzane River area until the reign of Mswati, and on the
north side of the Komati River none of the Hhohho district was even
allocated/...
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allocated until the 1840s and 1850s.(25) In the south things
were somewhat different. At least five of Sobhuza's sons were given
chiefdoms there, but if Mantintinti Is anything to go by, they only
took possession comparatively late in Sobhuza's reign.(26) After
accompanying Sobhuza to Mdlmba, Mantintinti "never set foot alive"
in the chiefdom he had been given, and it was only "during the time
of the return of the princes" to neighbouring Velezezweni that his
successor Mtfonga "was instructed to return".(27) In sum, thenf
the story told to Gardiner is at least partially confirmed. In the
area of conquest the Ngwane were, for most of Sobhuza's reign, a
nation under arms. Little of the conquered territory was settled,
' and the bulk of the population clustered for security in military
towns. Only in the final years of Sobhuza's reign did the situation
begin to change. Men could now be spared to reinforce the south,
and an administrative presence was gradually extended in the
conquered zone. Imperceptibly a shift was taking place to a
society less overtly parasitic, and less openly reliant on the naked
use of force.
The same process of integration accellerated in the reign of
Sobhuza's successor Mswati (1839-1865). Almost as soon as Mswati
-\ succeeded his father he was faced with a rebellion by his half-brother
Fokoti, and once that had been put down Mswati's mother Tandile and
his paternal uncle Malunge took it as the opportunity to set in
motion a series of far reaching reforms. On the face of it these
took mainlv political and ritual forms. The ritual supremacy of
the king as expressed in annual lncwala (first fruits) ceremonies
was bolstered by ritual importations from the Ndwandwe, and
Swaziland's military and administrative structures were systematised
bv creating nation-wide age regiments as the framework of
Swaziland's military organisation, and by establishing a far more
extensive network of roval villages to serve both as rallying points
for regiments and as centres for monitoring and supervising local
political activity.(28) The rationale behind these changes was
not/...
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not however solely political or ritual. The withdrawal of
young men from the agricultural cycle of their families homesteads
involved the direct appropriation of surplus labour by the royal
house since they were then set to work tilling the king's fields,
while changes in the incwala ceremonies and the establishment of
royal villages in the provinces were part of a wider process whereby
members of the royal family were being dispersed Into the regions,
as a means of securing control over all aspects of their activities
including the process of production.(29) Why this was needed
now is less easy to judge, but the most likely explanation is
Swaziland's declining ability to raid for booty and tribute in the
regions to the north and the west in the troubled period following
Sobhuza's death. Under Sobhuza such raiding had been widely
undertaken. Thonga traditions collected by Nachtigal are full of
references to Swazi attacks, and when Trichardt passed by the Pedi
in 1836 he was warned that the entire area to the west of the
Steenkampsberg was under Swazi control.(30) By the time the
trekkers arrived in the area, however, in the mid 1840s Swazi
raiding had all but ceased, and it may well have been the shortage
of surplus from these 'traditional* sources in a period of stress
that caused a tightening of the mechanisms of surplus extraction
in Swaziland itself.(31) r
The programme of reform evoked immediate opposition and before
long the regents were forced to back down by a coalition of regional
interests,(32) Further action in the matter had to await the
mid lSSO's as Mswati and his regents were now confronted in rapid
succession bv the rebellions of two of his elder brothers and by
two massed Zulu attacks. (33) 1832 however marked the end of
7ulu attacks, and Zulu energies were henceforth consumed by internal
wranglings over the succession.(34) As a result Mswati was able
to bring the country more systematically under his control as is
evidenced bv his attacks on the semi-autonomous Emakhandzambile
chiefs/*..
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chiefs{meaning 'those found ahead' i.e. those chiefdoms which
had occupied central and northern Swaziland prior to Sobhuza's
arrival from the Southf] Of the nineteen Emakhandzambile
chiefdoms about which I have definite information, fourteen suffered
in some way or other during this period, and in the cases of the
others it required the intervention of special factors or unusual
circumstances to save them from a similar fate. Thus the Mnisi,
the Thabedze, the Gamedze, the Mngometfulo, the Sifundza, the
Masilela, and the Mavirobela were all attacked by Mswati's forces
and it is also reported that the chiefdoms of the Mahlalela and
Moveni's Magagula would also have experienced similar treatment had
' It not been for the intercession of chance on the one hand and a
trusted royal relative on the other. (35) As for the others
their autonomies were no less completely circumscribed, with the
Ngwenya, the Oladla, the Mnclna and the Moyeni's Magagula being
demoted and placed under trusted officers of Mswati.(36)
It would of course be absurd to assume that all this was undertaken
in the immediate interests of surplus appropriation. In the case
of the Mnisi, e.g., their chiefdom was attacked because of the
extensive rain-making powers their chief deployed, and ritual factors
\ may have entered into Mswati's attack on others as well.(37)
Nevertheless underlying most of these assaults one can see attempts
to extend politico/economic control. In many instances it is
difficult to separate these two levels. The Mavimbela, e,g., were
attacked because they refused a royal wife from Mswati, and on the
face of it were reacting against the extension of political control.
Yet for them there was another dimension to the problem, since
marrving a princess involved the pavment of inflated sums of
bridewealth and so meant a heavy drain of cattle as well.(38) In
other cases economic issues are more clearly defined. Thus when
Mswati tried to extort tribute from the Sifundza and Masilela
peoples during a period of drought for example, his party was
intercepted/...
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intercepted as it returned and stripped of all that it had taken.
Mswati did not react immediately but, according to tradition,
bided his time until the offenders fears had been lulled. A
more serious consideration was probably fear of the Zulu, since
it is likely that these events took place in the drought of 1848.
Once the Zulu threat had begun to recede however the Masilela
were made to pay dearly for their crimes. A hunting party was
arranged to which the Masilela were summoned, and they were then
surrounded and annihilated by the rest of the assembled host (39).
The process whereby Mswati extended and rationalised his /
Dolitical and economic control over subject groups I would see
as marking the beginning of class society and the emergence of
the state. In the place of random and indiscriminate plundering
one now finds the development of more institutionalised mechanisms
for the appropriation of surplus, whose volume was at the same
time kept within reasonable limits by the need to retain the
loyalty and cooperation of subject groups against external enemies
like the Zulu. Side by side one also discerns the developing
institutions of the state; the age regiments, which socialised
the youth of subject peoples into a sense of national identity,
and whose labour and booty raiding enriched the dominant class; (
the expanded 11bandla or national council which represented all
interests in the country and whose participation was required for
all major political decisions Lthough here Hindess and Hirst's
comments on the means of representation should also be rememberedj(40);
the annual incwala_ ceremony in which the king and his people
are symbolically renewed each year, and so on. Whether at this"
embryonic stage they should be considered as existing entirely
independently of the ruling groups is obviously open to question.
Yet the same question remains open in the case of the feudal
state. The extent to which or manner in which this operates
"as/
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" as the necessary space for the representation of the various
classes " in the feudal mode of production is never properly
elaborated by Hindess and Hirst, leaving one with the sneaking
suspicion that even here it only partially fulfills that role.
The last question that I wish to consider in this section
is the precise configuration of class interests represented in
the early Swazi state. Terray in his recent article on "Classes
and Class Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman",
ultimately ducks that very question. He begins by defining
classes in terms of relations to the means of production, but
then goes on to characterise them as a relation of exploitation (41).
This will not do, for as Hindess and Hirst among others have
shown, there may be exploitation without classes ever arising,
as in the case of "banditry and extortion by political fbosses'" . (42)
Can we therefore say we have classes in pre-colonial
Swaziland? I believe we can, if only in embryonic form. Firstly,
land, the basis of the economic system and the principle means
of production , is controlled by the rulers and can be redistributed
by them in a variety of ways. Chiefdoms can have part of their
territory taken away from them and allocated to other groups;
they can be removed en masse to other parts of the country or
thev can have their local rulers replaced by relatives and
functionaries of the king.(43) Thus, while each individual
subject has acccfss to the means of production, he can have his
access restricted to means of greatly inferior worth. Much
the same goes for cattle and for wives* By a variety of
mechanisms such as witchcraft accusations, control over the
appropriate combinations of pasturage, variable brtdewealth pay-
ments, and preferential marriage patterns, the accumulation of
cattle/.....
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cattle can be restricted for the commoners and largely confined
to the ruling class. If one adds to this an appropriation of
surplus on the basis of these divisions which goes to maintain
a non-labouring ruling class, then one must concede the emergence
of class society if only in attenuated form.
But the question remains who precisely constitute these
classes ? In his study of the Abron kingdom of Gyaman Terray
sees a three-class division between a non-labouring group of
aristocrats and a class of working slaves on the one hand, and
tribute producing peasants on the other, but it seems questionable (
to me how clear cut this distinction was(44). Are we to believe
for example, that the Abron aristocracy was an entirely non-
labour;ng class and that neither'its women or cadets engaged t
in productive work? Certainly among the Swazi this was not the
case, for there a large section of the ruling group took part
in such pursuits. Instead what ve find there Is a more complicated
situation, with tribute being extracted from subordinate groups
in the various forms that we have mentioned, and then being partly
concentrated in the upper echelons of the ruling class and partly
filtering down. The important thing to remember here
however is the barrier that existed to surplus dribbling down V-
to the groups from which It had been drawn. Essentially this
was constituted out of Swazi marriage practices* Unlike their
Nguni counterparts the Swazi'practised a system of preferential
in-kin marriages, which tended to restrict cattle and other wealth
to within the ruling class. These restrictions, It is true,
were neither permanent nor impermeable. The marriage of
matrilateral cross cousins is much more flexible than its
patrilateral parallel variant which fixes genealogical relationships
in a virtually unchanging rhythm , and it was this the Swazi
practised/
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practised rather than the more inflexible kind (45). The
Swazi moreover marry their classificatory cross cousins and not
their actual mother's brother's daughters, and have preferential
marriages with a variety of other kin (46). Finally a more
general political expediency could involve an entirely different
order of preference, and led Mswati to exchange wives with
both Magagula chiefs (47). from the broader structural point
of view however the relationships which developed with the
conquered were decisively different from those of other Nguni
groups. Although offering a more flexible range of marriage
) options than parallel and true cross cousin marriage, the
various Swazi marriage preferences still concentrated them within
a restricted group of kin (48). The broad effect of this
was that while a degree of social and political mobility was
permitted, differences of political and social status were per-
petuated, which persist to this day. In Sobhuza's time these
were at their most intense. Marriages were confined politically
within the dominant Ngwane, and spatially to their military encamp-
ments, while wealth tended to circulate in the same restricted
group. Under Mswati there was a blurring at the edges of these
, categories, but otherwise they remained essentially intact,
leaving marriage practices to continue as a crucial determinant
of class.
Captives and Booty Raiding in the Tributary Mode of Production
Jack Goody in his essays on Tradition, Technology and the State
in Africa sees captives and tributary raiding as an integral part
of the tributary mode of production(although he does not use that
term). The low fertility of African soils, the relatively low level
of technology in most African societies (which make human muscle
power virtually the only means of power available), and low
population/...
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population densities, together make it impossible to extract
surplus from peasant communities on a scale similar to much of
Asia and Europe, and ensure that it is labour rather than land
that is the factor of production which is scarce. Out of this
arises bootv raiding as an important means of acquiring surplus,
and particularly the raiding of human booty as a source of labour
power. (49) Terray in his Gyaman study refines these ideas further.
The low level of surplus appropriation from peasant communities
he suggests is a consequence of the need of ruling aristocracies
to enlist the support of peasant communities in the face of threats
from outside. At the same time the fear of creating a permanently
dispossessed and disaffected slave population, as well as perhaps
other factors, ensures the gradual absorption of the captive and
his family into Gyaman society, and created the need to secure
further supplies of captives as a means of making good that loss.(50)
A number of the same points apply to Swazi society.
The part played by captives in the Swazi economy has been
considerably larger than is generally imagined.(51) Whether this
was always the case is difficult to say. When the Swazi was
centred on Shiselweni in the south of Swaziland between circa 1770 -
1820 e.g. their highly pastural economy may have meant that their (
needs for labour power were correspondingly reduced. The situation
changed once they moved from Shiselweni to Ezulwini. Here the
Dastorage was less rich and agricultural production more necessary,
and henceforth captives were raided far and wide.(52) According to
Ndambi Mkhonta the Ezulwini village once boasted large numbers of
captives, and the same is likely to be true of all royal capitals.(53)
Other examples which I have come across without directly questioning
on the subject are those of the Dube who were attacked and enslaved
in the reign of Mswati, and of the Thabede who suffered a similar
fate at. much the same time. (54) Sources of slaves fell in two
broad/...
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categories, although the distinction was probably blurred in the
early davs of the state. The first group comprised non-Swazi who
were raided outside their kingdom's boundaries (the Tltfunjwa).(55)
In Sobhuza's early conflicts with the chiefdoms of Magoboyi and
Mkise. for example, captives were taken and their presence in Swazi
society was used in later years to justify Mswati's right to cede
the eastern Transvaal* (56) Later it was the Thonga who bore the
brunt of these attacks and in was they-who in this case were most
usuallv traded as slaves. The other major source of supply were
children seized from households within the Swazi kingdom (the
) Tigcili). (57) As Tikuba told Stuart in 1898
It often happened that when a person was killed
for some crime or other and his cattle and children
seized, those children were taken by the Swazi and
sold to the Boers in the Transvaal. (58)
The Berlin missionary, Merensky9 reported on similar practices after
his visit to Swaziland in March 1860. "Even now" he wrote in his
diarv,
if a man of his (Mswati's) people has many daughters
or good cattle his soldiers come, surround the Kraal,
murder the old, and take the goung people and cattle
as booty. Children are being sold or given to the
'great of the realm1.(59)
What were the implications of these developments for the emergence
of the state and for the development of classes? Terray would
have us believe that they signal the emergence of slave classes and
of a slave mode of production, but as Hlndess and Hirst show a slave
mode of production presupposes private property in land and slaves,
and a form of commodity exchange corresponding to both*(go) Moreover,
given the rights and protection made available to captives in
Swazi society, it seems more appropriate to regard them as a group
of perpetual minors rather than as a clearly defined class.(61)
The/...
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The seizure of captives however did have other implications for
class formation, particularly when considered against the trade
In captives to the Transvaal. Without going into any details
this seems to have grown to substantial proportions by the middle
of the 1850's and then to have boomed to new levels for the first
half of the next decade.(62) The question that is inevitably
raised by these developments is to what extent the seizure of
captives for trade become an object in itself in the attacks |hat
were made on offending subject groups, and to what extent, in
Rodney's terms, this.led to the social degeneration of Swazi
society.(63) In other words to what extent 4o we see a robber ,
relation rather than a class relation coming to characterise
Swazi society? I would argue that for the most part the seizure
of captives did not become the objects of these attacks; that
they were a by-product of rationalising economic and political
contro, and that once this rationalisation was completed internal
captive-taking largely ceased. In its place however one finds a
shift of emphasis to Mozambique, the devastation and impoverishment
of that area in the. pursuit of captives, and perhaps some of the
earliest origins of the underdevelopment of Southern Mozambique,
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